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Survey of Utah Strict Products Liability Law: 
From Hahn to the Present and Beyond 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, the notion of hold- 
ing a manufacturer strictly liable for its defective products is 
premised "on the proposition that the cost of injuries caused by 
defective products . . . sold for profit should be considered a 
cost of doing business to be borne by manufacturers . . . rather 
than by the injured individuals."' The Utah court views strict 
products liability as a doctrine that aligns the public interest in  
promoting the production of safer products with the individual's 
interest in remaining free from injury caused by defective 
goods.' If nothing else, then, a broad-based policy orientation 
has guided the Utah court in its formulation of Utah strict 
products liability law. 
Notwithstanding its broad policy orientation, the Utah 
court has not decided a substantial number of cases dealing 
with strict products liability. In fact, since its 1979 adoption of 
the Restatement's section 402A3 formulation of strict products 
liability,* the Utah Supreme Court has heard relatively few 
cases in which the doctrine of strict products liability was a 
central issue. Still, the Utah court continues to affirm its long- 
standing adherence to section 402A, and there is little doubt 
that section 402A remains the basic formulation of strict prod- 
ucts liability law in Utah.5 
This comment surveys the Utah Supreme Court's decisions 
in the area of strict products liability law since its adoption of 
section 402A in Hahn. In addition, this comment reviews the 
impact several recent legislative enactments have on strict 
products liability law in Utah. Section I outlines the basic ele- 
1. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah 1985). 
2. Id. 
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
4. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). For a 
discussion of the Utah court's adoption of 8 402A in Hahn, see Lynn S. Davies, 
Comment, Strict Products Liability in Utah Following Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. 
Armco Steel Co., 1980 UTAH L. REV. 577. 
5.  See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah 1991). 
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ments of a section 402A cause of action and the various deci- 
sions of the Utah court that discuss and apply those elements. 
Section I1 discusses the affmmative defenses to strict liability 
actions that are recognized in Utah. Section I11 briefly discuss- 
es peripheral issues, including injuries to bystanders, statutes 
of limitations, and injuries to real property, which are never- 
theless important to an overview of Utah strict products liabili- 
ty law. Finally, because Utah is one of the relatively few juris- 
dictions that has not adopted some form of the second collision 
doctrine, Section IV explores this "subset" of strict products 
liability law and suggests the form of the doctrine that the 
Utah court will ultimately adopt when provided with the oppor- 
tunity to do so. 
I. THE ELEMENTS OF A SECTION 402A CAUSE OF 
ACTION AND THEIR APPLICATION UNDER UTAH LAW 
The specific language of section 402A provides that: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea- 
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property 
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a 
product, and 
(b) i t  is expected to and does reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which i t  
is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepa- 
ration and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or c,onsumer has not bought the product 
from or entered into any contractual relation with the 
~ e l l e r . ~  
In considering the implications and application of this section 
in Utah, a review of the essential elements of a strict products 
liability action is helpful because the Utah court appears un- 
willing to effectuate a wholesale adoption of section 402A7 or 
its official comments. Through selective adoption of those com- 
ments, the court has left open opportunities to interpret the 
6. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402A. 
7. See Davies, supra note 4, at 579-80. 
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section's language in ways that differ from those found in the 
official comments themselves.' Furthermore, judges have sub- 
stantial discretion in applying the comments because their lan- 
guage is not always pre~ise .~  
A. "One who sells"10 
The language of section 402A extends strict products liabil- 
ity to anyone who sells a defective product that is unreasonably 
dangerous to  a consumer." Hence, section 402A's language is 
broad enough to extend liability t o  several different entities or 
individuals within a distribution chain as "sellers," and the 
plaintiff is not limited to a product's manufacturer in seeking a 
recovery pursuant to a strict products liability theory.12 
The Utah Supreme Court has not specifically addressed 
the question of who or what constitutes a "seller" for section 
402A purposes, but there are indications that the court would 
extend liability to the seller of a particular product even if the 
seller was not the product's manufacturer. For example, the 
court has specifically adopted the language of section 402A,13 
and as noted above, the plain language of that section is broad 
enough to  extend liability to a non-manufacturing seller. In 
addition, the court has frequently used the terms "seller" or 
"sold" in the strict liability context,'* and the court appears 
willing to accept the full import of its language.15 
8. See Grundberg, 813 P.2d a t  92-95 (adopting the basic policy of comment k, 
but dictating an alternative application of that comment). 
9. See, e.g., id. at 100-04 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the 
majority's interpretation and application of comment k). 
lo. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, 8 402A(1). 
11. Id. 8 402A(l)(a) cmt. f. 
12. Id. 
13. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979). 
14. See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 91-92 (Utah 1991) ("the seller of 
such products"); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1981) 
("manufacturer or seller"); Hahn, 601 P.2d at  158 ("defendant sold products"). 
15. The Utah Court of Appeals has held that, under certain circumstances, 
retail sellers may seek inded ica t ion  from a defective product's manufacturer in 
strict products liability actions. 
In Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), a 
retail seller sought indemnification from an airplane's manufacturer for attorney's 
fees, costs, and expenses that the retailer incurred in defending a strict products 
liability action brought against the retailer, the manufacturer, and several others. 
Id. at 444. Before trial, a settlement was reached between the Hanover plaintiff 
and all of the named defendants. Id. at  444-45. The retail seller paid no part of 
the settlement, but the retailer sought indemnification from the airplane's manufac- 
turer for the above-stated costs. Id. at  445. The trial court granted summary judg- 
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Finally, the Utah court has implicitly acknowledged that 
non-manufacturing sellers can be held liable under a strict 
products liability theory. In Raithaus u. Saab-Scandia of Amer- 
ica, Inc.,16 the plaintiff brought a strict products liability ac- 
tion against the manufacturer of his automobile three and one- 
half years after his wife was tragically killed when the car 
caught fire. While the court focused its attention on the appli- 
cable statute of limitations,17 it made no suggestion that the 
inclusion of either the vehicle's American distributor or the 
local dealer as co-defendants in the cause of action was improp- 
er. Similarly, in Dowland u. Lyman Products for Shooters,18 a 
plaintiff injured when the breech of a rifle he was shooting 
exploded in his hand brought a products liability action against 
the firearm distributing company that sold him the rifle. As in 
Raithaus, the court did not address the appropriateness of 
naming non-manufacturing sellers as defendants in actions 
brought pursuant to a strict products liability theory,lg but 
the court's silence on the matter indicates at least some implic- 
it justification for holding non-manufacturing sellers liable.20 
B. "engaged in the business of sellingd1 
Section 402A also requires the seller to be "engaged in the 
business of selling" the defective product.22 Comment f indi- 
cates that section 402A liability does not extend to  
ment in favor of the manufacturer. Id. 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that in a strict 
products liability action, a retail seller may seek equitable indemnification from a 
product's manufacturer if (1) the retailer was free from wrongdoing; (2) the manu- 
facturer was either an active wrongdoer or produced a defective product; and (3) 
the manufacturer was given notice of the retailer's claim for indemnity. Id. at  447. 
Moreover, the retailer's claim for indemnification may extend to any judgment it is 
required to pay, as well as  attorney's fees, costs, and expenses incurred in defend- 
ing the suit. Id. at 446-47. Accordingly, because the manufadurer had clearly been 
notified, the court remanded the action for further proceedings wherein the trial 
court was to determine whether the manufacturer had produced a defective prod- 
uct, and whether the retail seller "was simply an innocent 'passive' link in the 
chain of commerce." Id. at  450. 
16. 784 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1989). 
17. Id. at  1160-62. 
18. 642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982). 
19. The issue before the court was improper admission of expert testimony. Id. 
20. See also UTAH CODE A N N .  § 78-15-6(1) (1992) ("sold by the manufacturer or 
other initial seller"). 
21. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402A(1). 
22. Id. § 402A(l)(a). 
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the occasional seller of food or other such products who is not 
engaged in that activity as part of his business. Thus it does 
not apply t o  the housewife who, on one occasion, sells . . . a 
jar of jam . . . . [or] to the owner of an automobile who, on one 
occasion, sells it to his neighbor.23 
The Utah court has never published a decision addressing 
strict products liability wherein the factual pattern was any- 
thing but decisive as to this element in a section 402A cause of 
action. As a result, the court has never addressed the proper 
scope of this element as a matter of law. 
For example, in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel 
CO.?~ the court reviewed the evidence supporting the jury's 
finding that the defendant manufacturer was strictly liable to 
the plaintiff in light of the elements of a section 402A cause of 
action. The court expressly found that there was "credible, sub- 
stantial evidence in [the] record" supporting the jury's finding 
that the defendant "engaged in the business of selling" the 
defective product.25 Such language reinforces the argument 
that the court accepts this element as a necessary part of a 
section 402A cause of action. The facts of Hahn, however, deci- 
sively established that issue. There was simply no reason to 
doubt that the manufacturer of the defective steel joists in 
Hahn produced them with the intention of selling them to 
others, and that it was "engaged," not only in the manufactur- 
ing business, but also in the "business of selling" its product. 
However, because factual patterns may not always be so clear- 
cut, and because the Utah court has not indicated what kind of 
activity does or does not fall within the scope of the "engaged in 
the business of selling" element, a definitive standard cannot 
be arti~ulated.~" 
23. Id. $ 402A cmt. f. 
24. 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). 
25. Id. at 158. 
26. But see discussion infra part I.C. While the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Conger v. Tel Tech, Inc., 798 P.2d 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), is most 
appropriately characterized as a decision defining the term "defective product," it is 
a t  least possible to view the court's decision as one finding that the defendant was 
not "engaged in the business of selling" integrated cleaning systems. This interpre- 
tation of Conger indicates a rather strid reading of the "engaged in the business of 
selling" element of a § 402A cause of action. Because the court of appeals did not 
address the facts before it in those terms, however, this interpretation of Conger 
would be a decidedly unstable platform upon which to build an entire argument. 
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C. "any 
Pursuant to  section 402A, the sale of "any product" sold in 
a defective conhtion unreasonably dangerous to  a consumer or 
the consumer's property can give rise to  strict products liabili- 
ty." In light of the decisions reached by the Utah court, it 
does not appear that the scope of this element is any narrower 
for purposes of Utah law than the plain language of the section 
indicates. The court has heard a number of cases wherein vari- 
ous types of products were either alleged, or actually found to 
be, both defective and dangerous, and with the exception of a 
limited exemption for prescription drugs, it has never indicated 
that products within a particular category are exempt from 
strict products liabilit~.~' 
The notion of a "product" is not limitless however. In Con- 
ger v. Tel Tech, Inc.?' the plaintiff sued pursuant to a strict 
products liability theory and argued that a manufacturer's 
installation of non-defective "spray balls" in an integrated 
cleaning system for a milk tanker without providing grit strips 
along the top of the tank created an unreasonably dangerous 
~ondi t ion .~~ The Utah Court of Appeals held that the negligent 
installation of non-defective products does not give rise to strict 
products liability.32 The court agreed with the plaintiffs asser- 
tion that the failure to  install grit strips may have rendered 
the tanker unreasonably dangerous, but in the court's view, it 
did not cause the spray balls themselves to become defective.33 
27. RE~ATEMENT, supra note 3, $ 402A(1). 
28. Id. 
29. See Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992) (firearm); 
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (prescription drug); Whitehead 
v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990) (automobile); Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (aircraft); Mulherin v. Ingersoll- 
Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981) (winch throttle control valve); Hahn, 601 
P.2d at 152 (steel joists). 
30. 798 P.2d 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
31. Id. a t  281. 
32. Id. a t  283. In support of its position, the court cited a decision by the 
South Carolina Supreme Court, DeLoach v. Whitney, 273 S.E.2d 768 (S.C. 1981) 
(refusing to extend strict liability to defendant who installed non-defective tire but 
failed to install new valve stem or tell plaintiff that the old valve stem had deteri- 
orated). 
33. Conger, 798 P.2d a t  282 & n.3. The court made reference to both support- 
ing and contrary authority in drawing this conclusion. See Hoover v. Montgomery 
Ward & Co., 528 P.2d 76 (Or. 1974) (refusing to extend strict liability to defendant 
who installed non-defective tire but failed to tighten the lug nuts when placing the 
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Under Conger, then, it appears that providing installation 
services in connection with the sale of a product does not, in 
and of itself, fall within the rubric of "product" for purposes of 
strict products liability. Of course, because the Utah Supreme 
Court did not address the Conger fact pattern, its adoption of 
the reasoning employed in Conger remains uncertain, as does 
the court's willingness to apply similar reasoning in slightly 
different factual settings. 
D. "in a defective condition"B4 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized "three types of 
product defects: manufacturing flaws, design defects, and inad- 
equate warnings regarding use."35 In Dowland v. Lyman Prod- 
ucts for Sh0oters,3~ the court stated that the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proving a product defect in a strict products liability 
cause of action and that the burden is met only upon a showing 
that the product at issue had an unreasonably dangerous de- 
fect?' The court upheld a jury finding in favor of the defen- 
dant because the plaintiff had failed to  establish that the rifle 
causing his injuries was dangerously defective upon the date it 
was deli~ered.~' While the plaintiffs expert established that 
the rifle's breech was designed so that its construction created 
a danger of explosion at pressures greater than 23,000 pounds 
per square inch, his experts did not establish that pressures 
even close to  that magnitude are produced when the appropri- 
ate powder is used.3g 
In a later decision, the court characterized its decision in 
Dowland as an application of, and adherence to, official com- 
ment g of section 402A.40 However, because the standard ar- 
ticulated by the Dowland court does not specifically incorporate 
all of the comment's requirements, the court's adoption of that 
comment is less than straightforward. Comment g indicates 
wheel on the hub and axle). But see Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 690 P.2d 
1280 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (defendant's failure to warn about the dangers of in- 
stalling a used inner tube in a non-defective new tire could itself constitute a prod- 
uct defect). 
34. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, 9 402A(1). 
35. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991). 
36. 642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982). 
37. Id. at 381. 
38. Id. at 381-82. 
39. Id. at 381. 
40. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 91. 
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that strict products liability extends 
where the product is, a t  the time it leaves the seller's hands, 
in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, 
which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller is 
not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition, 
and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful 
by the time i t  is consumed. The burden of proof that the prod- 
uct was in a defective condition at the time that it left the 
hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; 
and unless evidence can be produced which will support the 
conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sus- 
tained. 
Safe condition a t  the time of delivery by the seller will, 
however, include proper packaging, necessary sterilization, 
and other precautions required to permit the product to re- 
main safe for a normal length of time when handled in a 
normal manner.41 
A careful reading of this passage indicates that the standard 
set forth in comment g is twofold. In order for strict products 
liability t o  be extended to a particular defendant, the plaintiff 
must first establish that the defendant's product contained a 
defect unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. The Dowland 
decision and the standard articulated by the court in that 
decision clearly establish the Utah court's adoption of this first 
requirement.*' 
Comment g requires more however. Having established an 
unreasonably dangerous product defect, the plaintiff must also 
establish that the defective condition was present when the 
product left the defendant seller's hands. While the Utah 
court's adoption of this requirement is not as clear, the court's 
affirmation of the jury's findings implies that the product must 
be defective when it leaves the seller's handd3 This second 
requirement has also been codified at section 78-15-6 of the 
Utah Code: 
In any action for damages for injury, death, or prop- 
erty damage allegedly 'caused by a defect in a product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to 
be. in a defective condition, unless at the time the product 
41. RESI'ATEMENT, supra note 3, $ 402A cmt. g. 
42. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
43. Set! supra text accompanying note 38. 
UTAH STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
was sold by the manufacturer or other initial seller, 
there was a defect or defective condition in the product 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." 
Finally, there is some indication in Dowland that the Utah 
court approves of the "mishandling" and "other causes" lam 
guage of comment g as well.45 While the court did not address 
whether precautionary measures were provided or needed upon 
delivery of the rifle, it did note that the defendant had intro- 
duced evidence suggesting that the plaintiff used a powder 
with a far greater explosive charge than the rifle was designed 
to  utilize.46 In connection with its observation that normal use 
of the rifle did not create an actual danger of explosion,"' the 
court's reference to the defendant's evidence indicates the 
court's willingness to accept evidence that the plaintiff was 
mishandling the defendant's product and that the actual cause 
of his injury was the use of an inappropriate powder. Thus, at 
least implicitly, the court has accepted the "mishandling" and 
"other causes" exceptions to strict products liability that com- 
ment g enunciates. 
E. "unreasonably dangero~s'~' 
The Utah Code provides a definition of "unreasonably dan- 
gerous" that essentially elaborates on a similar definition found 
in official comment i. Section 78-15-6(2) of the Utah Code de- 
fines "unreasonably dangerous" as a 
product [that] was dangerous to an extent beyond which 
would be contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, 
consumer or user of that product in that community consider- 
ing the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers 0 
and uses together with any actual knowledge, training, or 
experience possessed by that particular buyer, user or con- 
s u ~ n e r . ~ ~  
44. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-15-6(1) (1992) (emphasis added). 
45. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, $ 40% cmt. h (indicating that a prod- 
uct is not defective if it is safe for "normal handling and consumption" and that a 
seller is not liable for any injuries or damages if the consumer misuses a product 
or handles it in an abnormal fashion). Available affirmative defenses are discussed 
infia at section 11. 
46. Dowland, 642 P.2d at 382. 
47. Id. at 381. 
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, $ 40%(1). 
49. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-15-6(2) (1992). 
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This definition does more than elaborate, however, for the 
language relating to the actual knowledge, experience, or train- 
ing of a particular buyer, user, or consumer is not found in 
comment i. This language suggests that Utah courts are re- 
quired to make factual inquiries into the subjective abilities 
and knowledge of a product's user when determining if a prod- 
uct is "unreasonably dangerous." Such an inquiry is not con- 
templated in section 402A or its accompanying comments; thus, 
when presented with identical fact patterns, a court conducting 
the additional inquiry suggested by the Utah statute may reach 
a different conclusion than a court applying only the principles 
enunciated in section 402A. 
For example, assume that manufacturer Z sells product Y 
t o  consumers A and B. Assume also that under the Utah stat- 
ute, Y contains a defect that is unreasonably dangerous to A, 
an ordinary consumer, but not to B because of special knowl- 
edge, training, and experience that B possesses. Finally, as- 
sume that both A and B sustain identical injuries caused by a 
defect in Y. Pursuant to section 402A, both A and B could re- 
cover from Z because a determination that the defect in Y is 
unreasonably dangerous turns on an objective inquiry based 
upon A, the ordinary consumer. 
On the other hand, under the Utah statute, B could not 
recover from Z pursuant to a strict products liability theory 
because B's special knowledge, experience, and training would 
lead to a finding that Y was not unreasonably dangerous to B. 
Thus, B could not satisfy this essential element in a strict prod- 
ucts liability claim. Whether the Utah Legislature actually 
intended this result is not clear from the notes accompanying 
the statute, but its language is certainly broad enough to  sup- 
port such an outcome. Until the Utah court has an opportunity 
to  interpret the statute, however, the degree to  which Utah law 
varies from that of other jurisdictions on this issue is unclear. 
1. Plaintiffs special knowledge and involuntary encounters 
with a defective condition 
Interpreting Utah's statutory definition of "unreasonably 
dangerous" in Beacham v. ~ee-Norse,~' the Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit found that the Utah statute "only lists 
50. 714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir. 1983). 
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factors to be considered in determining whether a product is 
unreasonably dangerous."' The plaintiff in Beacham lost four 
of his fingers when he instinctively reached out to break a fall 
and grabbed a piece of machinery at  its "pinch point."52 Defen- 
dants argued that the trial court's exclusion of evidence show- 
ing that plaintiff had actual knowledge of the pinch point and 
special training was erroneous because that evidence tended to 
show that the machinery was not "unreasonably dangerous."53 
The Beacham court found that other evidence before the jury 
was sufficient to establish plaintiffs actual knowledge of the 
danger, and accordingly, it concluded that the exclusion of addi- 
tional evidence was not unduly prej~dicial.~~ 
The court also indicated that Utah's statutory definition 
was not necessarily applicable where, as in Beacham, the plain- 
tiff encountered the danger involuntarily.55 The court stated 
that 
[wfiere a user encounters the defect involuntarily because a 
safety device was not provided, evidence of his actual knowl- 
edge, training, or experience is of only limited value: 'We 
have difficulty seeing how the knowledge of the dangerous- 
ness can alleviate the dangerous condition inasmuch as the 
performance by plaintiff of his assigned tasks subjected him 
to injury regardless of the care exerci~ed."~~ 
Thus, at least in situations where the plaintiff involuntarily 
encounters a defective condition, there is some case law sup- 
porting the position that his actual knowledge, training, or 
experience regarding that condition is of little weight in deter- 
mining whether a product is "unreasonably dangerous" pursu- 
ant to the Utah statute.57 
51. Id. at 1016. 
52. Id. at  1012-13. 
53. Id. at  1015. 
54. Id. at  1016. 
55. Id. (the Beacham plaintiff was an employee in a coal mining operation). 
56. Id. (quoting Davis v. Fox River Tractor Co., 518 F.2d 481, 485 (10th Cir. 
1975)). I t  should be noted that the Beacham court's language was overly broad. At 
least in some sense, all consumers injured by a defective product "encounter[] the 
defect because a safety device was not provided." Id. Thus, if the court's language 
was given full effect, Utah's statutory definition of "unreasonably dangerous" would 
be rendered a nullity. 
57. But see Conger v. Tel Tech, Inc., 798 P.2d 279, 282 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (listing assumption of risk as a defense to strict products liability and fmd- 
ing that employee who used cleaning system after recognizing danger assumed risk 
of continued use). 
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2. What constitutes adequate directions or warnings? 
Comment j indicates that a seller may be required to pro- 
vide directions or warnings in order to avoid a finding that its 
product is unreasonably dangerous.58 As noted earlier, the 
Utah court views "inadequate warnings about a product's use" 
as a product defect:' and a manufacturer who "knows or 
should know of a risk associated with its product . . . is directly 
liable to the [user] if it fails to adequately warn . . . of [the] 
danger."60 However, while these statements clearly establish a 
duty to warn, the court has not articulated any standards as to 
what actually constitutes an adequate warning. 
The language of comment j suggests that directions or 
warnings are adequate if a consumer can safely use a product 
by following those warnings or  direction^.^' Because the ade- 
quacy of a warning is largely a factual inquiry that turns on 
the specific attributes of a particular product, the Utah court 
will probably adopt a similar generalized standard if ever con- 
fronted with the issue. Likewise, the Utah court will probably 
adopt a related rule that there is no duty to warn when the 
danger or potentiality of danger is generally known and recog- 
nized, or when the product is dangerous only if excessively 
used or used over a long period of time.62 
3. Unavoidably unsafe products 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the "basic policy" of 
official comment k "as the law to be applied" in the state of 
Utah." Comment k states that 
[tlhere are some products which, in the present state of hu- 
man knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for 
their intended and ordinary use . . . . Such a product, proper- 
ly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warn- 
ing, i s  not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous . . . . 
The seller of such products . . . is not to be held to strict lia- 
bility for unfortunate consequences attending their use, mere- 
ly because he has undertaken to supply the public with an 
58. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, $ 40% cmt. j. 
59. Grundberg v. Upjohn, 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991). 
60. Id. at 97. 
61. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, $ 40% cmt. j. 
62. Id. 
63. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 92. 
11731 UTAH STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1 185 
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a 
known but apparently reasonable risk.64 
As examples of "unavoidably unsafe products," comment k lists 
vaccines and experimental drugs, and it is in the prescription 
drug context that the Utah court addressed the unavoidably 
unsafe product exception. 
In Grundberg, the plaintiff argued that she had "shot [and 
killed] her mother as a result of ingesting the drug Halcion, a 
prescription drug manufactured by [the] defendant Upjohn to  
treat ins~mnia."~ In considering the application of comment 
k, the court noted that its express terms only excepted unavoid- 
ably unsafe products to the extent that they were allegedly 
defective in their design? If the seller of an unavoidably un- 
safe product mismanufactured its product or failed to provide 
adequate warnings for its use, it could still be held strictly 
liable notwithstanding the fact that its product could not be 
designed so as to possess a greater degree of safety.67 The 
court stated that "[tlhis limitation on the scope of comment k 
immunity is universally re~ognized."~~ 
The court then went on to decide how comment k should be 
applied when a design defect is clearly alleged and considered 
several different approaches that have been followed in other 
jurisdi~tions.~~ These approaches can essentially be divided 
into two major groups. One approach requires the trial court to  
make a case-by-case determination of whether a product is 
unavoidably unsafe, either as a matter of fact, or by utilizing 
some form of riskhenefit analysis.70 A second approach was 
adopted by the California Supreme Court in Brown u. Superior 
Court," wherein the court extended comment k immunity to 
all prescription drugs as a matter of law and thereby over- 
64. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, $ 402A cmt. k. 
65. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 90. 
66. Id. at 92. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. (citations omitted). 
69. Id. at 92-95. 
70. See, eg., Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 305-06 (Idaho 1987), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 942 (1988) (case-bycase riskhenefit analysis: not unavoidably 
unsafe if any feasible alternative design would accomplish same purpose with less 
risk); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 924 (Kan. 1990) (case-bycase as 
a matter of fad); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781-82 
(R.I. 1988) (case-bycase riskhenefit analysis: if reasonable minds could differ, then 
send to jury; if not, directed verdict as  to comment k immunity). 
71. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). 
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turned a previous decision to apply a riskhenefit analysis on a 
case-by-case basis. 
After reviewing the two alternatives, the Utah court opted 
for the second.72 Unlike the court in Brown, however, the 
Utah court did not find that the language of comment k sup- 
ports the position that all prescription drugs are unavoidably 
unsafe products. The court recognized that "by characterizing 
all FDA-approved prescription medications as 'unavoidably 
unsafe,' [it was] expanding the literal interpretation of com- 
ment k."73 Nevertheless, the court found that policy justifica- 
tions and the FDA's elaborate regulatory scheme for drug ap- 
proval and distribution justified its holding.74 In addition, the 
court noted that the Utah Legislature had extended special 
protection to FDA-approved drugs and indicated that compli- 
ance with applicable government standards a t  the time a prod- 
uct is marketed raises a rebuttable presumption that a product 
is not defective.75 
Finally, the Grundberg court expressed its view that the 
FDA approval process was a better forum for utilizing a 
riskhenefit analysis than a trial court." While the court said 
it did not believe "that courts [were] unsuited to address design 
defect claims in any product liability action,"77 it found that 
[iln light of the strong public interest in the availability and 
affordability of prescription medications, the extensive regula- 
tory system of the FDA, and the avenues of recovery still 
72. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95. 
73. Id. at 90. 
74. Id. at  94-98. In support of its position, the court cited, as  policy justifica- 
tions, society's substantial need for and the unique benefit of prescription drugs, 
the increased cost and curtailment of drug development that would result from 
greater liability, and the extensive screening mechanisms, careful scrutiny, pre- 
market review, and post-market surveillance employed by the FDA. But see Barson 
v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 836 (Utah 1984) (FDA standards are 
minimums-even aRer FDA requirements are met, liability may extend if manufac- 
turer knew or should have known about dangers). 
75. Grundberg, 813 P.2d a t  97. The Utah Code provides that "punitive damages 
may not be awarded if a drug causing the claimant's harm: (a) received premarket 
approval or licensure by the [FDA] . . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2(1) (1992). 
The Utah Code also provides that a rebuttable presumption that a product is non- 
defective arises "where the alleged defect in the plans or designs for the product or 
the methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product 
were in conformity with government standards established for that industry which 
were in existence at [that] time." UTAH CODE ANN. 8 78-15-6(3) (1992). 
76. Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 98-99. 
77. Id. at  98. 
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available to plaintiffs by claiming inadequate warning, 
mismanufacture, improper marketing, or misrepresenting 
information to the FDA. . . a broad grant of immunity from 
strict liability claims based on design defects should be extend- 
ed to FDA-approved prescription drugs in ~ t a h . ~ ~  
Thus, the court concluded that "a drug approved by the [FDA], 
properly prepared, compounded, packaged, and distributed, 
cannot as  a matter of law be 'defective' in the absence of proof 
of inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, or fraudulent informa- 
tion furnished by the manufacturer in connection with FDA ap- 
proval."79 
F. "to the user or consumer or to his property's0 
The Restatement does not require a plaintiff to be in con- 
tractual privity with the defendant or to have purchased the 
product in order to bring a strict products liability cause of 
action." Furthermore, the Restatement provides that a user 
may be only passively enjoying or working upon a product in 
order to state a claim.82 While the Utah court has not specifi- 
cally addressed this issue, its decisions do not suggest that the 
class of potential plaintiffs in s t r id  products liability actions is 
any narrower than the Restatement's language indi~ates. '~ 
The Utah decisions also indicate that recovery is available 
for damage to property. In fact, the decision wherein the Utah 
court adopted the section 402A formulation of strict products 
liability was an action to recover property damages?* Howev- 
er, the language of section 402A indicates that recovery can 
only be obtained for "physical harm . . . caused to the ultimate 
user or consumer, or to his property."85 Thus, whether a plain- 
tiff may recover under a strict products liability theory for 
economic injuries alone, or economic injuries in connection with 
damages to the plaintfls person or property, remains an open 
question in ~ t a h . "  
Id. at 99 (emphasis added). 
Id. at 90. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, $ 402A(1). 
RESATEMENT, supra note 3, $ 402A cmt. 1. 
Id. 
See, e.g., Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 
passenger in vehicle); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 
employee of purchaser). 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979). 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, $ 402A(1) (emphasis added). 
See W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42, 43-46 (Utah 
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While the Utah court's adoption of section 402A results in 
the extension of liability to a manufacturer of a defective prod- 
uct without regard to the manufacturer's fault, the court has 
carefully pointed out that strict products liability does not ren- 
der manufacturers absolutely liable.87 A manufacturer is not 
an insurer of its product and the product's use.88 
The Utah Supreme Court has formally recognized two 
affirmative defenses that a defendant may assert in a strict 
products liability action.89 First, the defendant may argue that 
the user or consumer misused the produ~t.~' Second, the de- 
fendant may argue that the user or consumer unreasonably 
used the product "despite knowledge of the defect and aware- 
ness of the danger."g1 
In the Utah court's view, these affmative defenses do not 
completely bar plaintiffs recovery-even if the plaintiffs fault 
exceeded that of the  defendant'^.'^ The Mulherin court stated 
1981) (allowing plaintiff to recover for economic injuries associated with damage to 
property pursuant t o  a negligence theory, but expressly leaving open the question 
of Ywlhether or not a manufacturer should be held to a standard of strict liability 
for economic losses resulting from the failure of [its] product to fulfill the commer- 
cial needs of the purchaser"). 
The court noted several jurisdictions that had denied recovery for economic 
damages in strict products liability actions. See State ex. rel. Western Seed Prod. 
Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215 (Or. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); 
Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977); Berg v. Gen- 
eral Motors Corp., 555 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1976), superseded by statute as stated in 
Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 1199, 1205-06 (Wash. 
1989). 
87. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1981). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at  1302-03. For a discussion of the Utah court's adoption of comparative 
principles in the strict products liability setting, see Jeff L. Mangum, Note, The 
Merger of Comparative Fault Principles with Strict Liability in Utah: Mulherin v. 
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 964; Mark E. Wilkey, Comment, Mulherin 
v. Ingersoll: Utah Adopts Comparative Principles in Strict Products Liability Cases, 
1982 UTAH L. REV. 461. 
90. Mulherin, 628 P.2d a t  1303. 
91. Id.; see also Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 
(Utah 1979) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS $ 402A cmts. g & n (1965), 
in support of these defenses); Conger v. Tel Tech, Inc., 798 P.2d 279, 282 n.4 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (listing assumption of risk as a defense to strict products 
liability and finding that employee who used cleaning system after recognizing 
danger assumed risk of continued use). 
92. Mulherin, 628 P.2d a t  1303-04. 
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that circumstances "where the faults of both plaintiff and de- 
fendant . . . unite[] as concurrent proximate causes of an inju- 
ry . . . [,I both faults should be considered by the trier of fact in 
determining the relative burden each should bear for the injury 
they have caused."g3 Thus, even if a plaintiffs misuse of a 
product is responsible for 95% of the injury, the plaintiff could * 
still sue the product's manufacturer in a strict products liability 
cause of action. While this result differs decidedly from that 
allowed by the Utah comparative negligence statute effective at  
the time Mulherin was decided, the court expressly found that 
statute inapplicable to the facts before it.94 
Subsequent to Mulherin, however, the Utah Legislature 
rewrote the statutes governing the application of "comparative 
negligence." Section 78-27-38 of the Utah Code provides that 
the fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar 
recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant 
or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, 
no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any 
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to 
that defendant.95 
Initially, it should be emphasized that this statute is a compar- 
ative fault statute, not a comparative negligence statute as its 
title indicates. Moreover, because the definition section defines 
the term "fault" very broadly, this statutory language expands 
the scope of available affrmative defenses beyond that impli- 
cated in a narrowly tailored comparative negligence statute. At 
the same time, the statute's language eliminates a defendant's 
liability when the fault of the plaintiff exceeds that of the de- 
fendant. 
Section 78-27-37(2) defines "fault" as "any actionable . . . 
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to  injury 
or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including, 
but not limited to . . . contributory negligence, assumption of 
risk, strict liability, . . . products liability, and misuse, modifi- 
93. Id. at 1303. 
94. Id. at 1303-04 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. 8 78-27-37 (1953) (barring recovery 
when defendant's negligence does not exceed plaintiffs, but applying onIy to negli- 
gence actions)); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402A cmt. n (user or con- 
sumer barred from recovery if aware of danger but proceeds unreasonably to make 
use of product). 
95. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1992). 
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cation or abuse of a produ~t."'~ Hence, the same comparative 
fault principles appear to govern whether the plaintiffs cause 
of action sounds in negligence or strict products liability. If the 
degree of fault attributed to a defendant for manufacturing a 
defective product unreasonably dangerous to the consumer is 
not greater than the degree of fault attributed to a plaintiff 
who has misused that product, then the plaintiff cannot recover 
damages for the injury. This directly contradicts the Utah 
court's position in Mulherin and represents a change in Utah 
law. 
Furthermore, while the court has expressly recognized the 
two affirmative defenses to strict liability discussed above, 
nothing in the statutory language prohibits a defendant in a 
strict products liability action from asserting the defense of 
contributory negligence as well. While the Utah court has not 
specifically addressed this issue in the context of a strict prod- 
ucts liability action, it has done so with regard to the Utah 
drarnshop statute. 
In Reeves v. Gentile:' the court stated that "[tlhe fact that 
the dramshop statute is a strict liability statute does not pre- 
clude comparison of the negligence of the intoxicated person 
and of the person seeking recovery."g8 The court then rea- 
soned that given a factual pattern where the plaintiffs negli- 
gence was greater than that of the intoxicated driver, holding 
the dramshop defendant liable for the full amount of damages 
"would subvert the intent and purpose of the comparative neg- 
ligence statute" and would constitute absolute rather than 
strict liability." At the same time, however, the court stated 
that "comparative negligence does not have application to 
dramshop defendants."lw These statements can be reconciled 
if the defendant's culpability is considered apart from the issue 
of causation. 
To establish a defendant's culpability in a strict products 
liability cause of action, the plaintiff need only show that the 
defendant engaged in the particular activity that gives rise to 
96. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 78-27-37(2) (1992). 
97. 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991). 
98. Id. at 117. 
99. Id. (the court had previously asserted that the purpose of the comparative 
negligence statute was to limit recovery in proportion to the fault of the person 
seeking recovery). 
100. Id. at 116 (several of the dramshop defendants sought a finding of compar- 
ative fault among themselves). 
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strict liability-that the defendant acted negligently, purpose- 
fully or with extreme malice is irrelevant. Thus, because the 
defendant is strictly liable, there is no need to assess the rela- 
tive degree of fault attributable to  the plaintiff or defendant, 
and comparative negligence is consequently inapplicable for 
culpability purposes. 
On the other hand, the comparative negligence of the 
plaintiff is very relevant when considering whether the 
defendant's actions caused the plaintiffs injuries. It is entirely 
possible for a defendant's actions to  render him culpable under 
a strict liability theory, but at the same time, contribute only 
marginally to the actual injury of the plaintiff. To allow the 
plaintiff a full recovery from the defendant in such a situation 
would render the defendant absolutely liable and a virtual 
insurer of the plaintiffs actions. The Utah Supreme Court was 
unwilling to accept absolute liability with regard to  the 
dramshop act in Reeves, and given the similar purpose underly- 
ing strict products liability law, the court is unlikely t o  impose 
absolute liability on a defendant in a strict products liability 
action. lo' 
In sum, while Mulherin extends the use of comparative 
principles to  strict products liability actions through the a i r -  
mative defenses of misuse or unreasonable use of a product, 
the Utah comparative negligence statutes provide a court with 
a potential avenue for allowing the defense of comparative 
negligence in strict products liability actions as well.lo2 While 
this would not necessarily signal a dramatic departure from 
prior common law precedent, it does potentially expand the 
number of available defenses. '03 
101. See id. a t  117 (citing statutory language and purpose in support of extend- 
ing contributory negligence defense). 
102. It should be noted that "[tlhe failure to wear a seat belt does not constitute 
contributory or comparative negligence, and may not be introduced as  evidence in 
any civil litigation on the issue of injuries or on the issue of mitigation of damag- 
es." UTAH CODE ANN. $ 41-6-186 (19%). The Utah Supreme Court reached the 
same conclusion in Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 
1990), but the court did hold that for purposes of establishing the safety of a 
vehicle's design, evidence that seatbelts were provided is admissible. Id. a t  927-28. 
103. Section 78-15-5 of the Utah Code also bears directly on the affirmative 
defense of comparative fault in strict products liability actions. That section pro- 
vides that for the purposes of evaluating the comparative fault of the plaintiff, 
fault shall include an alteration or modification of the product, which oc- 
curred subsequent to the sale by the manufacturer or seller to the initial 
user or consumer, and which changed the purpose, use, hnction, design, 
or intended use or manner of use of the product from that for which the 
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111. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Injuries to Casual Bystanders, 
Non-consumers, Non-users and Others 
and others 
consumers" 
Comment o indicates that casual bystanders 
injured by a defective product who are not "users or 
have not been allowed t o  recover against a seller pursuant to a 
strict liability theory? While comment o neither supports 
nor criticizes this position, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that 
non-user plaintiffs may sue pursuant to a strict products liabil- 
ity theory in some settings. 
In Julander v. Ford Motor Co.,lo5 the plaintiffs were in- 
jured when their car collided with a Ford Bronco.'06 The 
plaintiffs brought a strict products liability action against Ford, 
alleging that the accident was caused by defects in the Bronco's 
design that caused the driver to  lose control of his vehicle.lo7 
Ford argued that non-users of a product could not bring an 
action for strict products liability, but the Tenth Circuit dis- 
agreed.lo8 The court stated that "the post-Restatement evolu- 
tion" of strict products liability law persuaded it to allow the 
plaintiffs in Julander to proceed under such a theory of recov- 
ery. log 
While the court's decision in Julander certainly indicates 
product was originally designed, tested, or intended. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 8 78-15-5 (1992). While similar language can be found in 8 78- 
27-37(2), the above quoted section sets forth the standards in greater detail. 
The Tenth Circuit indicated that a previous version of this statute required 
'some sort of physical alteration or modification of the product itself which leaves 
the product in a different condition or form than i t  was in when it left the 
manufacturer's . . . hand." Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 
1983). Accordingly, the Bemham court held that the elevation of a "roof bolter" on 
crib blocks did not constitute an "alteration or modification" for purposes of the 
statute. Id. Moreover, in the event i t  did, the alteration was not a "substantial 
contributing cause of the injury." Id. The "substantial contributing cause" standard 
is no longer relevant. The current language of 8 78-15-5 substituted '[flor purposes 
of Section 78-27-38, fault shall include" for '[nlo manufacturer or seller of a prod- 
uct shall be held liable for any injury . . . sustained as a result of an alleged de- 
f ed  . . . in the use or misuse of that product, where a substantial contributing 
cause of the injury, death, or damage to property was." 
104. RESI'ATEMENT, supra note 3, 8 402A ant. o. 
105. 488 F.2d 839 (10th Cir. 1973) (interpreting Utah law). 
1 Id. at  841. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at  845 .  
109. Id. 
11731 UTAH STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1193 
an expansion of the class of plaintiffs able to sue pursuant to a 
strict products liability theory, the Tenth Circuit did not articu- 
late any reason for its conclusion that Utah should follow the 
move towards expanded liability and adopt the position it artic- 
ulated. Accordingly, because the Utah Supreme Court has not 
had an opportunity to either specifically address the question 
or adopt the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, strict products liability 
law on this issue remains uncertain. 
B. Further Processing and Component Parts 
The Utah court has yet to directly confront a factual pat- 
tern wherein a manufacturer's product undergoes further pro- 
cessing or other change before reaching the ultimate consumer, 
or where the manufacturer's product is a component part in a 
larger product. Comment p of section 402A indicates that "[tlhe 
question is essentially one of whether the responsibility for 
discovery and prevention of the dangerous defect is shifted to 
the intermediate party who is to make the  change^.""^ Tak- 
ing no official position, the comment suggests that the outcome 
of such inquiries will ultimately turn on the varied factual sce- 
narios presented to the court. Accordingly, until the Utah court 
addresses these issues, it is difficult to determine what direc- 
tion Utah law will take. 
C. Statute of Limitations 
In Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,"' the plaintiff was in- 
jured when a pistol he was carrying discharged inadvertently 
after falling out of its holster and landing on the running board 
of the plaintiffs truck. Several months prior to the expiration 
of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff learned that he might 
have a cause of action against the manufacturer due to manu- 
facturing defects in the pistol.""he plaintiff filed his action 
two days after the statute of limitations period had ex- 
pired.ll3 The Utah Supreme Court held that the statute of 
limitations in a strict products liability action begins to  run on 
the date of injury, and that the discovery rule is inapplicable 
when the plaintiff learns of a possible cause of action prior to  
110. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, $ 402A cmt. p. 
111. 823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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the expiration of the statute of  limitation^."^ 
While Atwood is a recent decision, the statute of limita- 
tions interpreted by the court in that case no longer governs 
strict products liability actions. Because the action in Atwood 
was filed in October of 1988 and the injury occurred some four 
years prior to that date, it was governed by section 78-12-25(3), 
a catch-all statute of limitations for actions "for relief not other- 
wise provided for by law."l15 As of April 24, 1989, however, a 
new statute of limitations for products liability actions became 
effective.l16 Section 78-15-3 states that a "civil action under 
[the Product Liability Act] shall be brought within two years 
from the time the individual who would be the claimant in 
such action discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence would 
have discovered, both the harm and its cause." Because section 
78-15-3 contains language indicating that a plaintiff must be 
aware of both the harm and cause, the applicability of Atwood 
in future strict products liability actions may be limited.ll' 
D. Real Property 
In Loueland v. Orem City Corp.,l18 the plaintiffs argued 
that residential developers should be held strictly liable for 
deficiencies in real estate the plaintiffs had pur~hased."~ The 
court stated that "[allthough such a theory has some appeal 
from a risk-spreading standpoint and because of the obvious 
reliance house buyers place on developer expertise," strict prod- 
ucts liability should not be extended to real estate transac- 
tions. 120 
IV. SECOND COLLISIONS, ENHANCED INJURIES, 
AND CRASHWORTHINESS 
"Second collisions," "enhanced injuries," and "crashworthi- 
ness"'" are buzzwords associated with a legal doctrine that 
114. Id. at 1064-65. 
115. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-12-25(3) (1992). 
116. Id. $ 78-15-3 (1992). 
117. Previous versions of the Product Liability Act contained a six-year statute 
of repose. As a result, the Utah Supreme Court declared the A d  unconstitutional 
in light of the Utah Constitution's open court provision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). See also Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of America, 
784 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1989) (declaring the six-year time period a statute of repose). 
118. 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987). 
119. Id. at  770-71. 
120. Id. at 770. 
121. Where possible, I will utilize the term "second collision doctrine" to refer to 
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results in the extension of liability for design or manufacturing 
defects that do not cause an accident, but nevertheless increase 
the severity of a plaintiffs injuries when an accident oc- 
curs.'= Enhanced injuries are generally sustained when a de- 
sign defect causes a second collision, a structural defect fails t o  
protect a plaintiff in a reasonably foreseeable accident, o r  when 
a design defect is incorporated in the surface or object with 
which the plaintiff collides in a second c~llision.'~~ 
The second collision doctrine originated in Larsen v. Gener- 
a l  Motors Corp.,la an Eighth Circuit decision upon which 
courts rely for the proposition that plaintiffs should recover for 
enhanced injuries caused by a defective design.125 Obviously, 
all courts adopting Larsen agree with this fundamental proposi- 
tion. These courts also agree, at least ostensibly, on two impor- 
tant corollaries of the second collision doctrine: 
First, because the allegedly defective product played no role 
in causing the plaintiffs initial accident, the manufacturer 
can be held liable only for enhanced or aggravated injuries 
that would not have occurred absent the alleged defect in the 
product, and cannot be held liable for injuries attributable to 
the initial collision. Second, the plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving that the alleged defect caused the enhanced inju- 
ries. 126 
However, courts adopting the second collision doctrine do not 
agree on what constitutes adequate proof that a defective prod- 
uct caused an enhanced injury.ln More precisely, they differ 
on which party bears the burden of apportioning the respective 
injuries among the first and second collisions. 
In deciding this question, courts are confronted with two 
this doctrine. 
122. See, eg . ,  Craigie v. General Motors Corp., 740 F. Supp. 353, 356 (E.D. Pa. 
1990); James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Products Liability: Sufficiency of Proof of 
Injuries Resulting from "Second Collision," 9 A.L.R. 4TH 494 (1981). While the 
second collision doctrine is most commonly applied in cases involving some kind of 
vehicle, it is not necessarily restricted to that application. See Couch v. Mine Safe- 
ty Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585 (Wash. 1986) (unsafe design of hardhat gave rise 
to products liability for enhanced injuries incurred when tree fell on logger's head). 
123. Barry Levenstam & Daryl J. Lapp, Plaintifs Burden of Proving Enhanced 
Injury in Crashworthiness Cases: A Clash Worthy of Analysis, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 
55, 57 (1989); see also Pearson, supra note 122, at 497-98. 
124. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). 
125. Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 123, at 60-61. 
126. Id. at 62. 
127. Id. 
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important considerations. First, there is a problem of proof. 
Second collision cases often involve complex patterns of causa- 
tion that are very difficult to trace. Moreover, the underlying 
theory of second collision cases is to impose liability upon a 
manufacturer only for those injuries that are actually en- 
hanced, or injuries that are over and above what the injured 
party would have received absent the design defects. Analyti- 
cally, such a theory requires "proof" of what would have oc- 
curred absent the defect. Thus, in order to apportion the inju- 
ries between a first and second collision, one party or the other 
must "prove" a hypothesis that has no basis in the occurrence's 
actual facts. Courts are naturally uncomfortable with that kind 
of speculation-and some simply declare that "proving" such 
matters is impossible.lB 
Second, there is the need to strike a balance between im- 
portant public policies that are often a t  odds with one another 
in the second collision context. On the one hand, courts want to 
protect consumers from enhanced injuries actually caused by 
defective products; on the other, courts want to avoid the impo- 
sition of absolute liability for a product's use on its manufactur- 
er. Where a court decides to strike the balance dictates the 
emphasis, and ultimately the outcome, of its opinion-both as 
to the policy considerations and as to the problem of proof. As a 
result, courts adopting the second collision doctrine apply it in 
two fundamentally different ways, neither commanding a clear 
majority. lZ9 
A. Plaintiff Bears the Burden of Apportioning 
Damages Between the First and Second Collision 
One approach to the application of the second collision 
doctrine is sometimes referred to as the "sole factor" ap- 
proach.lsO The "sole factor'' approach requires a plaintiff to 
prove that the enhanced injuries sustained in a second collision 
were caused by a defective condition in the applicable prod- 
uct.13' In order to do so, the plaintiff must establish what in- 
juries would have been received absent the design defect, and 
show that the defective product was the sole factor contributing 
128. See Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 788 (10th Cir. 1978). 
129. In application, there is actually a range among the levels of proof required. 
See Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 123, at 62 n.35. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
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to the enhanced injuries sustained. Stated differently, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of apportioning the injuries to the 
first and second collision and proving those injuries that are ac- 
tually enhanced injuries. '32 
The jurisdictions adopting this approach generally employ 
reasoning similar to that of the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in Huddell u. Levin.'" In Huddell, the driver of a 
Chevrolet Nova was killed when his car was hit from behind 
after running out of gas on the Delaware Memorial Bridge.'" 
While most of his other injuries were superficial, the driver's 
skull was extensively fractured when his head struck the head- 
132. For example, in Harvey ex rel. Harvey v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 
1343 (10th Cir. 1989), the plaintiff established that he was injured when he was 
ejected from his car during a rollover, but he did not establish that the injuries he 
sustained "were over and above those which would have been sustained had the T- 
Top [on his car] remained in place and had [he] remained inside the vehicle." Id. 
at  1350. The jury found that the plaintiffs car was "in a defective condition unrea- 
sonably dangerous" to the plaintiff, and that the defective condition was a proxi- 
mate cause of his injuries. Id. at  1346 n.1. The jury also found that the plaintiff 
and the defendant were each 50% a t  fault, and that the fault of each was a proxi- 
mate cause of plaintiffs injuries. Id. Notwithstanding these findings, however, the 
jury did not award any damages to the plaintiff. Id. 
On his motion for a new trial and later on appeal, the plaintiff argued that 
the jury's failure to award any damages was inconsistent with its findings of mul- 
tiple liability and proximate causation against the defendant. Id. a t  1346. The 
Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's finding that the jury's failure to award dam- 
ages was "consistent with the proposition that the plaintiff did not establish the 
extent of enhanced injuries, if any, attributable to the defective design of the T-Top 
on [plaintiff's car]." Id. at 1351. In other words, because the plaintiff offered no 
evidence that his ejection from the car resulted in injuries of greater severity than 
he would have sustained had he remained in the car during the accident, the jury 
was not able to determine what plaintiffs enhanced injuries actually were. Because 
under Wyoming law plaintiff bears the burden of establishing such injuries, and 
because the defendant is only liable for those injuries that are actually enhanced 
injuries, the jury's award of zero damages was all the plaintiffs proof could sus- 
tain. 
For other examples of decisions adopting some formulation of this position, see 
Chretien v. General Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1992) (unpublished opin- 
ion), available in LEXIS & Westlaw databases (holding that plaintiff had burden of 
proof, but declining to decide if "crashworthiness" cause of action existed in Virgin- 
ia); Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Pennsyl- 
vania law that it had previously interpreted); Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 
F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying Colorado law); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk 
A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying New York law); Huddell v. Levin, 537 
F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976) (interpreting New Jersey law); Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk 
AG, 591 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 599 A.2d 162 (N.J. 
1991); Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585 (Wash. 1986). 
133. 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976). 
134. Id. at 732. 
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rest after impact.ls5 The driver's estate brought a diversity 
action for enhanced injuries against General Motors Corpora- 
tion pursuant to a strict liability theory, arguing that the head- 
rest was defective in design because "its relatively sharp edge 
of unyielding metal allowed for excessive concentration of forces 
against the rear of [the driver's] The jury found that 
the headrest was defective and that it was a substantial con- 
tributing factor in the driver's death.'" Accordingly, the jury 
awarded a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the 
defendant in excess of two million  dollar^.'^' 
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that a plaintiff must 
prove three specific elements in an enhanced injury cause of 
action: 
First, in establishing that the design in question was defec- 
tive, the plaintiff must offer proof of an alternative, safer 
design, practicable under the circumstances . . . . Second, the 
plaintiff must offer proof of what injuries, if any, would have 
resulted had the alternative, safer design been used. . . . 
Third, as a corollary to the second aspect of proof, the plain- 
tiff must offer some method of establishing the extent of en- 
hanced injuries attributable to the defective design.ls9 
As to the first element, the court noted that the plaintiff had 
offered sufficient proof to submit the issue of defective design to 
the jury and sustained its finding that the headrest was defec- 
tive.140 As to the second and third elements, the court ac- 
knowledged that the plaintiffs had established that the acci- 
dent would have been "survivable" absent the defective design, 
but that alone was insufficient apportionment of the injuries 
between the first and second collision.141 "It was not estab- 
lished whether the hypothetical victim of the survivable crash 
would have sustained no injuries, temporary injuries, perma- 
nent but insignificant injuries, extensive and permanent inju- 
ries, or, possibly, paraplegia or quadriplegia."'42 For this and 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 735. 
137. Id. at 732. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 737-38. 
140. Id. at 736. 
141. Id. at 738. 
142. Id. 
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other reasons, the court ordered a new trial.143 
In support of its allocation of the burden of proof, the Third 
Circuit stated that while the driver of the car striking 
Huddell's car may be liable for all injuries arising out of the 
accident, the theory underlying the enhanced injury doctrine 
dictates that General Motors is only liable for those injuries 
that are actually enhanced injuries? 
Analogies to concurrent actions combining to cause a single 
impact are simply not applicable. Similarly, analogies to 
chain collisions are not applicable, where, as [in Huddell], one 
party is sued on a fault theory for the collision and the other 
party is sued on the theory of strict liability for the "second 
other words, because " '[slecond collision' cases do not impli- I 
cate 'clearly established double fault' for the same occur- 
ren~e ," '~~  the court simply did not believe that traditional tor t  
theories relating t o  accidents involving concurrent proximate 
causes of a single collision should govern enhanced injury cas- 
es. 147 
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the 
indivisibility of Huddell's death precluded General Motors from 
attempting to divide responsibility and limit its liability.148 
While noting that the New Jersey Death By Wrongful Act stat- 
ute treated death as an indivisible injury, the court pointed out 
that it is the plaintiff who suggests divisibility by arguing the 
enhanced injury theory.149 In fact, the "apportionment. . . 
contemplated [in a second collision case] is not a division 
among the injuries that the plaintiff sustained, but rather the 
difference between the injuries actually incurred and the inju- 
ries that would have resulted in the collision in the absence of 
the alleged defect."l5' That being the case, the court was sim- 
143. Id. at 731. 
144. Id. at 738. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. The court also reasoned that while the plaintiff should bear the burden of 
apportioning the injuries, the plaintiffs failure to do so would not excuse all 
wrongdoers. Id. at 738-39. "Should plaintiff fail to meet her burden on this claim, 
the brute fact is that the negligent driver would not escape liability on the same 
ground." Id. at 739. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 123, at $4. 
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ply unwilling to "accept the proposition that suing for wrongful 
death suffices to convert limited, second collision, enhanced 
injuries liability into plenary liability for the entire consequenc- 
es of an accident which the automobile manufacturer played no 
part in precipitating."l5l 
In sum, pursuant to the "sole factoryy approach, the 
plaintiffs burden of establishing causation is not met unless 
the plaintiff can prove injuries resulting from the second colli- 
sion over and above those which would have been received 
absent the defective condition. In the event the injuries are 
actually indivisible, the plaintiff will be unable to meet this 
burden of proof and the cause of action against the product's 
manufacturer will fail. While this may be a difficult burden to 
meet, the jurisdictions adopting this approach view it as ana- 
lytically consistent with the enhanced injury theory and the 
generally accepted notion that manufacturers should not be 
held to a standard of absolute liability. 
B. Defendant Bears the Burden of Apportioning 
Damages Between the First and Second Collision 
Another approach to the application of the second collision 
doctrine is sometimes referred to as the "substantial factoryy ap- 
proach152 and, like the "sole factor" approach, also requires a 
plaintiff' to prove that the enhanced injuries sustained in a 
second collision were caused by a defective condition in the 
applicable product. However, the "substantial factoryy approach 
does not require the plaintiff to establish what injuries would 
have been sustained absent the defect. A plaintiff need only 
establish that the defective product was a substantial factor 
contributing to the injury.153 After the plaintiff establishes 
that the injuries were caused by a defective product, the bur- 
den of proof shifts to the defendant to apportion the injuries 
resulting from the first and second collisions.'" 
151. Hudckll, 537 F.2d at 739. 
152. Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 123, at 69-70. 
153. Id. at 70. 
154. For example, in Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 646 P.2d 1020 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1982), a f d ,  692 P.2d 345 (Idaho 1984), the plaintiff was injured when he 
drove his car at  55 miles per hour into the back of a parked car. Id. at  1022. 
Plaintiff sued pursuant to a strict products liability theory and argued that his 
injuries were enhanced as a result of a defective seat belt and energy-absorbing 
steering column. Id. at 1021. After the plaintiff presented his evidence, the trial 
court held that the plaintiff "had failed to make a prima facie case for en- 
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Jurisdictions adopting this approach generally look t o  the 
Tenth Circuit's decision in Fox u. Ford Motor C O . ' ~ ~  for guid- 
ance. In Fox, two passengers in the rear seat of a Ford Thun- 
derbird were killed when the car in which they were riding was 
struck head-on by another vehi~le.'~?J?he plaintiffs brought a 
strict liability action against Ford Motor Co., alleging that both 
women sustained enhanced injuries because of defective seat 
belts and passenger compartment padding.'57 The jury found 
that the car was defective and that the defects were the prox- 
imate cause of death.'58 Accordingly, the jury awarded a judg- 
ment of $650,000 in favor of the plaintiffs.15' 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that Wyoming would 
adopt the enhanced injury doctrine if presented with the ques- 
tion,160 and then considered the application of that doctrine. 
The Tenth Circuit stated that the duty t o  prove enhanced dam- 
ages is generally a "part of the plaintiffs responsibility to prove 
proximate cause, that is, that the defendant in such a case is 
liable only for those damages which are within the orbit of risk 
hancement of injuries" because he "had not proven what his injuries would have 
been if the seat belt and steering column had functioned properly." Id. a t  1023. 
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that 
[i]f the defects are shown to be a substantial factor, then the burden of 
proving apportionment falls on the defendants. Where no apportionment is 
established, the plaintiff is entitled to recover fully from any defendant 
whose defective product was a substantial factor in producing the injuries. 
However, where the injuries are apportioned, the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover only for injuries in excess of those which probably would have 
occurred absent the defects. 
Id. at 1024-25. The court then went on to find that, although the plaintiff had 
failed to specifically establish a causal c o ~ e c t i o n  between his injuries and the 
alleged defects in his car, he had presented sufficient evidence to support a legiti- 
mate inference that a causal relationship existed. Id. at 1025. Accordingly, he met 
his burden of establishing a prima facie case, and the trial court's directed verdict 
was reversed. Id. a t  1025-26. 
For other examples of decisions adopting this approach, see Mitchell v. 
Volkswagenwerk AG, 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Minnesota law); Fox 
v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (interpreting Wyoming law); Gen- 
eral Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 1985); Lahocki v. Contee 
Sand & Gravel Co., 398 A.2d 490 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev'd on 0 t h -  
grounds, 410 A.2d 1039 (Md. Ct. App. 1980); Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 
406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991). 
155. 575 F.2d a t  774. 
156. Id. at 777. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 788. 
159. Id. at 777. 
160. Id. at 781. 
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created by him."'" Nevertheless, unlike the Third Circuit in 
Huddell, the Tenth Circuit could not 
see any difference between [an enhanced injury] case and the 
other case in which two parties, one passive, the other active, 
cooperate in the production of an injury. Each one's contribu- 
tion in a causal sense must be established. Damages may be 
apportioned between the two causes if there are distinct 
harms or a reasonable basis for determining the causes of 
injury. 162 
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit adopted a different position 
with regard to the divisibility of death. In the court's view, 
death "is not a &visible injury in which apportionment is either 
appropriate or po~sible."'~~ The court stated that the Third 
Circuit's position in Huddell failed "to recognize that [a] wrong- 
ful death [action] is different from [a] cause of action for inju- 
ries, which has different elements and a different measure of 
damages such as pain and ~uffering."'~~ 
Finally, because it considered the apportionment issue 
irrelevant, the court approved the trial court's unwillingness to 
provide jury instructions on enhanced injuries and apportion- 
ment of damages between the first collision and defective de- 
sign. 
[Tlhe jury had found Ford liable for the deaths and thus there 
was little basis for contending that apportionment continued 
to be relevant. There is no evidence in the record, in any 
event, as  to how much damage the collision produced assum- 
ing the decedents survived, but i t  is not only an impossible 
question to answer, i t  is a moot one, since Ford was adjudi- 
cated to have caused the deaths which produced the damages 
for which suit was brought. Since the damages were limited 
to those allowed under the wrongful death act and Ford was 
responsible for the deaths and the damages related to the 
deaths, no apportionment problem remained. 
In other words, the Tenth Circuit held that the proof offered by 
the plaintiffs establishing that the car's defects were the prox- 
161. Id. a t  787. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. (citations omitted). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. a t  787-88. 
166. Id. a t  788. 
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imate cause of death, and that the women would have survived 
absent those defects, was sufficient to impose liability upon the 
defendant. 
In short, pursuant to the "substantial factor" approach, a 
plaintiff satisfies the burden of proving causation if the plain- 
tiff shows that the defective product was a substantial factor 
contributing to the injury. Once the plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case, the defendant manufacturer is treated as a 
concurrent tortfeasor and is held jointly and severally liable. 
The defendant manufacturer may then attempt to limit its 
liability by apportioning divisible injuries between the first and 
second collisions. In the event the injuries are not divisible, the 
manufacturer is jointly and severally liable for the total 
injury-liability that is essentially absolute. 
C. Predicting the Future: Which Approach Will Utah Adopt? 
The Utah Supreme Court has not specifically addressed 
the second collision doctrine; thus, articulating a definitive rule 
of law for the State of Utah is impossible. There is little reason 
to doubt, however, that the Utah court will adopt the doctrine 
in some form or another. When Larsen v. General Motors 
Corp.lQ was decided, a line of authority originating in the 
Seventh Circuit's decision in Evans v. General Motors Corp. 
essentially held that a manufacturer does not have a responsi- 
bility to foresee collisions in designing and building its 
product. l" Since Larsen, however, the. jurisdictions which em- 
brace the Evans reasoning are becoming increasingly few in 
number.'?' Still, assuming that the Utah court will adopt 
some form of the second collision doctrine, the particular ap- 
proach the court will take in applying that doctrine remains to 
be seen. 
An initial question that the Utah court will face in the 
enhanced injury context is whether application of the enhanced 
injury doctrine is appropriate in strict products liability actions 
167. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). 
168. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), overruled, Huff v. 
White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977). 
169. Id. at 824. 
170. See Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 123, at 61 nn.32-33 (noting only two 
jurisdictions adopting Evans since Larsen (however, those two have now adopted 
Larsen as well, see Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 
1991)), and listing 35 states and the District of Columbia as having affirmatively 
adopted Larsen). 
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or in negligence actions alone. While many jurisdictions apply 
the enhanced injury doctrine in the negligence context, some 
courts are hesitant t o  extend it to  a strict liability 
setting-particularly if they are not required to  do so.171 
Other courts view the enhanced injury doctrine as a particular 
species of products liability law17' and never concern them- 
selves with the appropriateness of extending liability for en- 
hanced injuries in the strict products liability context. 
As t o  the Utah court's treatment of this issue, it should be 
noted that the broad-based policy justifications underlying its 
extension of strict products liability in other areas are certainly 
broad enough to  support the extension of such liability pursu- 
ant to  an enhanced injury theory of recovery. Holding a prod- 
uct's manufacturer strictly liable for enhanced injuries caused 
by its products is certainly consistent with the "proposition that 
the cost of injuries caused by defective products" should be 
borne by the manufacturer profiting from their ~a1e.l'~ Like- 
wise, liability for enhanced injuries promotes both the "produc- 
tion of safer products" and the public's interest in avoiding 
injuries "caused by defective goods."'" Given this policy ori- 
entation, the Utah court will probably have little difficulty in 
applying both the enhanced injury doctrine and strict products 
liability within a single conceptual framework. 
The more difficult question, of course, is where to place the 
burden of proof for the enhanced injuries. Which party will 
bear the burden of apportioning the injuries t o  the first and 
second collision and proving those injuries that are actually 
over and above what the plaintiff would have received absent 
the defective product? As stated earlier, the jurisdictions adopt- 
ing the second collision doctrine split on this issue. The Utah 
Supreme Court, however, is likely to place that burden upon 
the plaintiff. 
In jurisdictions requiring the defendant t o  apportion the 
injuries, the defendant in a second collision case is viewed as a 
171. See Fox v. Ford Motor Corp., 575 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1978) (deciding 
it was unnecessary to determine whether strict liability applied to enhanced injury 
cases); Larsen, 391 F.2d at 503 n.5, 506 (stating that the duty in enhanced injury 
cases "should and can rest, at this time, on general negligence principles," and 
leaving the decisions as to strict liability open for states to decide on their own). 
172. See Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir. 1991); Gen- 
eral Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1181 (Ma. 1985). 
173. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah 1985). 
174. Id. 
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concurrent tortfeasor. So long as the defects are a substantial 
factor contributing to the plaintiffs injuries, the manufacturer 
is liable for those injuries that its defective product caused. If 
the injuries the plaintiff receives are indivisible, then the man- 
ufacturer is held jointly and severally liable for the unfortunate 
consequences of the entire accident.lT5 
This result is flatly inconsistent with the Utah comparative 
negligence statute, particularly in light of the fact that many 
second collisions are initiated by first collisions resulting from 
the negligent or reckless behavior of the party seeking recov- 
ery. Utah's comparative negligence statute provides that "no 
defendant is liable t o  any person seeking recovery for any 
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant."176 In other words, there is no joint and several 
liability for actions covered by that section. Moreover, because 
the section applies to any person seeking recovery, and because 
"a person seeking recovery" is defined as anyone "seeking dam- 
ages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on the behalf of 
another,"lT7 it would clearly be applicable in an action for 
damages resulting from enhanced injuries caused by a defective 
product. lT8 
Holding a manufacturer jointly and severally liable in an 
enhanced injury case involving indivisible injuries also violates 
the Utah court's position that manufacturers are not subject t o  
absolute products liability.17g Considering the court's predis- 
175. See discussion supra part 1V.B. 
176. UTAH CODE ANN. 78-27-38 (1992). 
177. Id. $ 78-27-37(3). 
178. Id. $ 78-27-38. In fact, the Utah statutes governing comparative fault sug- 
gest that some form of the second collision doctrine may already be present in 
Utah law. The statutes define fault as any "act, or omission proximately causing or 
contributing to" a plaintiffs injury. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-27-37(2) (1992) (emphasis 
added). The term "contributing" could be construed to include the enhancement of 
a particular injury. Accordingly, a plaintiff would only need to establish that a 
defective product "contributed" to her injury for the apportionment of fault to be- 
come an issue appropriate for jury deliberation. While apportioning fault is seman- 
tically different from apportioning injuries between first and second collisions, it 
probably makes little substantive difference. Because the party who must apportion 
fault would likely need to apportion injuries between the first and second collision 
to establish that a product defect was or was not a factor "contributing" to the 
user's injuries, the central issue is essentially the same. Hence, unless the court 
construes the term "contributing" so broadly that the defective product's manufac- 
turer is liable simply because the product was somehow within the chain of causa- 
tion, it will ultimately still be required to decide who bears the apportionment 
burden. 
179. See Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah 1981); see 
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position against requiring a product's manufacturer to function 
as a virtual insurer of the product and its use,lsO it is unlike- 
ly that the court would extend absolute liability in the en- 
hanced injury setting. 
Finally, the policy arguments advanced in support of the 
"substantial factor" approach are not likely to be persuasive 
enough to draw the Utah court away from its established policy 
orientation. For example, in adopting the "substantial factor" 
approach, the Idaho Court of Appeals pointed out that the 
defendants in Larsen had opposed the enhanced injury doctrine 
because apportioning the damages between a first and second 
collision is difficult.181 The court then noted language from 
Larsen, wherein the Eighth Circuit said: 
"This is no persuasive answer and, even if difficult, there is 
no reason to abandon the injured party to his dismal fate as a 
tr&c statistic, when the manufacturer owed, at least, a com- 
mon law duty of reasonable care in the design and construc- 
tion of its product. The obstacles of apportionment are not 
in surmoun table."lg2 
The Idaho Court of Appeals does not explain, however, why 
this quote from Larsen requires the surmountable burden of 
apportionment to  fall upon the defendant; nor does the court 
offer any policy justification for extending what amounts t o  
absolute liability to defendant manufacturers when the injury 
is indivisible. 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, second collision cases in- 
volve the apportionment between the injuries actually sus- 
tained and those that would have resulted absent the defect, 
not the apportionment of injuries actually received by the in- 
jured party.183 A plaintiff upon whom the burden of appor- 
tionment falls in a second collision case is not required to di- 
vide an indivisible injury such as death; what the plaintiff is 
required to do is offer some evidence that establishes what 
injuries would have been received absent the design defect. 
also Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 117 Wtah 1991) (refusing to disallow compar- 
ative negligence defense in dramshop case because it would result in absolute lia- 
bility of dramshop defendants). 
180. Mulherin, 628 P.2d at 1302. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87. 
181. Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 646 P.2d 1020, 1024 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1982), affd, 692 P.2d 345 (Idaho 1984). 
182. Id. (quoting Larsm, 391 F.2d at 503). 
183. Levenstam & Lapp, supra note 123, at 84. 
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While this suggests "proof" of a counter-factual hypothetical, it 
would be no less counter-factual if the defendant were required 
to "prove" it. In addition, absolute proof and precise detail as t o  
the injuries is not required; the plaintiff need only establish the 
alternative injuries by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Thus, given the policy orientation evidenced in recent deci- 
sions of the Utah Supreme Court and the likelihood that it will 
adopt the second collision doctrine in some form, the court will 
probably place the burden of apportioning injuries between the 
first and second collision squarely upon the plaintiff. However, 
it is possible that the Utah court will choose an alternative 
application, especially when one considers the substantial split 
of authority on the issue and the lack of any binding precedent 
to guide the court. 
As noted at the outset, the Utah Supreme Court has adopt- 
ed the strict products liability theory found in section 402A as 
the basic formulation of strict products liability law in Utah. 
For the most part, then, Utah strict products liability law es- 
sentially reflects the law from other jurisdictions adopting the 
section 402A formulation. In the absence of a contrary Utah 
decision that is directly on point, counsel should be be relative- 
ly safe in arguing the majority rule as set forth in the official 
comments accompanying section 402A. 
There are, however, some variations and elaborations of 
section 402A in Utah law that should be particularly noted. 
First, pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Con- 
ger v. Tel Tech, Inc.,la negligent installation of a non-defec- 
tive product does not give rise to strict products liability in 
Utah.lS5 Second, section 78-5-6(2) of the Utah Code appears 
to require factual inquiries into the subjective abilities and 
knowledge of a product's user in determining if the product is 
unreasonably dangerous. Third, pursuant to the unavoidably 
unsafe exception, the Utah Supreme Court has extended a 
blanket exemption from strict products liability for design de- 
fects in prescription drugs approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration. Finally, the comparative fault principles ex- 
tended to strict products liability actions through the Utah 
184. 798 P.2d 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
185. Id. at 281-83. 
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court's decision in Mulherin u. Ingersoll-Rand Co.lS6 and sec- 
tion 78-27-38 of the Utah Code may provide for defenses or 
immunities from strict products liability not recognized in other 
jurisdictions. 
Additionally, while the Utah court is likely to adopt some 
form of the second collision doctrine, just how it will apply that 
doctrine is uncertain. Nevertheless, in light of the policy orien- 
tation exhibited in its recent decisions, the Utah court is most 
likely to place the burden of apportioning the damages between 
the first and second collision upon the plaintiff in a strict prod- 
ucts liability action. 
Robert A. McConnell 
186. 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981). 
